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July 19, 2013

2013.07.19: FYI: Trayvon: Goetz 1987, Zimmerman 2013

From: Michael Letwin
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 10:33 AM
To: 1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS
Subject: FYI: Trayvon: Goetz 1987, Zimmerman 2013

The City Sun, July 15‑21, 1987

An Open Letter on the Goetz Trial


As public defenders, we represent clients who overwhelmingly are young Black and Latino men. From this perspective, we express our outrage with the Goetz decision and with the atmosphere of pervasive racism that permeated the entire case from the time of the Goetz arrest until now.

The verdict endorses Goetz’s view that young Black men asking for money in the subway—without uttering any threats or displaying a single weapon—are by definition committing a crime. It also endorses Goetz’s position as self‑appointed executioner, as evidenced by his statement to Darrell Cabey, “You seem to be all right, here is another.”

The undeniable message of the case reinforces the fact that white civilians can join white police in legally murdering Black people—Michael Stewart, Eleanor Bumpurs, Jonah Perry, Nicholas Bartlett and so many others—they perceive as a threat Vigilante terror against Black people is once again encouraged in New York.

More importantly, the jury did not act alone. Rather, the decision was preordained by the media and criminal “justice” system. It was led by the prosecution, which tried to throw the case in the grand jury and by the trial judge, who initially dismissed the charges. They worked hand in hand with the defense to put the victims, Cabey, James Ramseur, Barry Allen and Troy Canty, on trial, thereby shifting attention away from Goetz’s attempt to murder them.

The media and criminal “justice” system painted Goetz as a white knight and his victims as “Black scum” who got what they deserved. The jury simply did what it was programmed to do.

As public defenders, it is clear that there was a disparity in treatment between “defendant” Goetz and our own clients.

For example, in our experience judges almost never permit on‑the‑scene or in‑court “crime re‑enactments,” not to mention using Guardian Angels to stage these spectacles. Nor do judges ever give jury instructions so favorable to the defendant that a client’s acquittal is inevitable, even in the face of evidence overwhelmingly in the defendant’s favor. In addition, Judge Crane’s contempt citation of James Ramseur in the presence of the jury, while surrounded by five court officers, biased the jury against the victims.

In our experience, the prosecution almost always gives all of its witnesses immunity to testify. As a tactical matter, it is rare that a prosecutor would put on a witness who is likely to sabotage the prosecution’s case.

Yet, in the Goetz case, we saw these and other such actions which do not occur when the defendants are Black or Latino.

We urge all New Yorkers to join us in condemning this all too predictable verdict and the racism it represents.

(The signers of this letter are attorneys and legal workers at the Legal Aid Society. We speak here only for ourselves and not for the Legal Aid Society.)

Julie A. Clark • Michael Letwin • Kimberly L. Detherage • Sharon Buckle • Robin Kuranko • Daniel Ashworth • Florence Morgan • Robert Zuss • LeRoi Gill • Carmen James • Calvin Simons • Robert Ellis • Ellen S. Sacks • Jane Coleman • Ruby Green • Tony Powell • Trilby DeJung • Eric Meggett • Luce Rocque • Valerie Greene • Betsy Barros • Derrick Jones • Joseph Licitra • Catharine Grad • Steven Lubowitz

2013.07.19: Trayvon: Our Free Speech Rights in Court

Filed under: ALAA History,Civil Liberties,Contempt,Free Speech,Key Documents — nyclaw01 @ 10:26 am

From: Michael Letwin
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 10:26 AM
To: 1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS
Subject: Trayvon: Our Free Speech Rights in Court

In response questions about our right to wear buttons, etc. for Trayvon, please see the decision below. (With thanks to Robin Frankel and Troy Yancey.)
[Emphasis added]
165 A.D.2d 382 (1st Dept., 1991)
In the Matter of Robin Frankel et al., Petitioners, and Association of Legal
Aid Attorneys in the City of New York District 65, UAW, Petitioner- Intervenor,
George Roberts, as Justice of the Supreme Court, New York County, et al.,
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York
April 2, 1991
CITE TITLE AS: Matter of Frankel v Roberts
Original proceeding in the nature of a writ of prohibition, commenced in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking to prohibit respondent Supreme Court Justice from enforcing his judgment and order requiring petitioners to remove a certain political button.
Courts–Attorney Attire–Order of Judge Directing Attorneys to Remove Political Button from Lapels
(1) A Supreme Court Justice presiding over a criminal part where only arraignments, initial plea bargaining, and motion practice are conducted improperly ordered, under pain of being relieved as counsel or held in summary contempt, attorneys to remove from their lapels a political button stating that the wearer, a Legal Aid attorney, would be “Ready To Strike”. The order was improvident exercise of the court’s authority to control the courtroom and the proper administration of justice.
Am Jur 2d, Contempt, §§ 207380; Trial, § 39.
NY Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, §11Contempt, §13.
Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 ALR3d 353.
Laura R. Johnson and Michele Maxian of counsel (Robert M. Baum, attorney), for petitioners.
Leonard Leibowitz for petitioner-intervenor.
John J. Sullivan of counsel (Robert Abrams, Attorney- General, attorney), for respondent. *383
Paul H. Levinson and Steven J. Hyman of counsel (Leavy Rosensweig & Hyman, attorneys), for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.
Asch, J.
Petitioners seek an order under CPLR article 78 to prohibit respondent Justice George Roberts from enforcing his judgment and order requiring petitioners, on penalty of being relieved or held in contempt, to remove a political button from their lapels which states “Ready To Strike”.
The incident in question took place in Part 30 of the New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term, where only arraignments, initial plea bargaining and motion practice are conducted. Hearings and trials with witnesses and jurors are conducted in other courtrooms.
On October 4, 1990, petitioner Robin Frankel an attorney employed by petitioner Legal Aid Society was ordered to remove the “Ready To Strike” button from her lapel. When she refused to do so, she was summarily removed as counsel for petitioner Albert Smith who was a criminal defendant in a proceeding now pending before Justice George Roberts and an “18-B” attorney was assigned to represent him. Petitioner Troy Yancey, also an attorney employed by the Legal Aid Society, on the same date, was ordered to remove a similar button from her lapel. On her refusal to do so she was ordered from the court and instructed not to return to represent any defendant while wearing that button.
Judge Roberts announced he would relieve the Legal Aid Society as counsel whenever a case was called if the Legal Aid attorney wore a “Ready To Strike” button. He stated further, that on the next day any such attorney would be summarily held in contempt and an appropriate sanction imposed. Justice Roberts sought to explain that he was not taking any position on the threatened strike but would not have the attorneys “politicizing” an issue “extraneous to the work that is conducted in this courtroom.”
Justice Roberts has on his own accord stayed his order upon petitioner’s agreement to file this article 78 application and seek an expeditious determination.
In La Rocca v Lane (37 NY2d 575,cert denied424 US 968) a priest-lawyer, working for the Legal Aid Society as a defense attorney, brought an article 78 proceeding because the Trial *384 Judge refused to allow him to wear his clerical collar while appearing before the jury in the course of a trial. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, it did so only because “the particular limited religious practice has been found to conflict with the State’s paramount duty to insure a fair and impartial trial. The respective interests must be balanced to determine whether the incidental burdening is justified” (supra, at 583). In La Rocca, the Court of Appeals found that a jury might view statements made by a member of the clergy differently then those of others and might ascribe a greater degree of veracity and personal commitment to the rightness of his client’s cause. On the other hand, religious prejudices, often insidious and unstated, might spill over from the lawyer-cleric to the defendant. The court therefore decided that the trial court by compelling defense counsel to remove the symbol of his religious calling before the jury, while incidentally limiting counsel’s right to free exercise of religion, acted to preserve the right of both the defendant and the People to a fair trial (supra, at 584). Obviously, the La Rocca principles do not impel a similar result in the case before us. Even assuming the button might predispose a juror to favoritism or prejudice as to counsel’s client, Justice Roberts’ part had no jury to be impressed favorably or unfavorably.
We find that the mere act of wearing a button which has some expression of political import, under the circumstances herein, is an exercise of speech protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution and article I, § 8 of the NY Constitution. While the Trial Judge had the inherent power, in fact the obligation, to require order in the courtroom, the right of an individual under the First Amendment may not be limited or subordinated in his freedom of expression to anything less than the absolute requirement to prevent the obstruction of justice. “‘[T]rial courts … must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.”‘ (In re Little, 404 US 553, 555,quoting Brown v United States, 356 US 148, 153.)
The freedom of expression protection afforded by the First Amendment and article I, § 8 unquestionably extends to the courtroom. “Every citizen lawfully present in a public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in question, whether that place is a school, a library, a private lunch counter, the grounds of a statehouse, the grounds of the United state capitol, a bus terminal, an airport, or a welfare *385 center. As we stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972), ‘[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.’ ” (United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 184-185 [Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part].) Thus, petitioners wearing a button with a political slogan would be entitled to the same protection that would be afforded if the button were worn in any other public place. This manner of expression was not basically incompatible with the normal activity and operation of this courtroom devoid of jurors or witnesses.
As such, it clearly presented no “serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice”. (See, Craig v Harney, 331 US 367, 373.) “[W]hile it is the duty of a Judge to preserve order and to insure that justice is not obstructed, it nevertheless follows that any order or regulation imposed upon attorneys practising before him, must be based upon factual conditions which leave no doubt that a continuance of the proscribed conduct will result in a disrespect for order and an impairment in the administration of justice. To this end, therefore, any such order or rule must have a reasonable or plausible basis, else this discretionary power is subject to being declared arbitrarily exercised” (Matter of Peck v Stone, 32 AD2d 506, 508 [order of Judge prohibiting female attorney from wearing miniskirt in courtroom was arbitrary]).
In addition, petitioners contend, and it is not disputed, that Justice Roberts took issue not with the fact that petitioners wore buttons but with the message expressed. Thus, petitioners assert he told them that he would permit the wearing of “Save the Whales” buttons. What obviously concerned him was the content of the button itself which he felt would be “unsettling” to the client.
Our Court of Appeals has noted the different approach that must be taken when there is an official attempt to restrict content of speech as compared with its time, place and manner. “The State is permitted considerably more latitude in restricting the time, place and manner of speech than it is when it attempts to restrict content. Time, place and manner restriction are valid if reasonable and rationally related to legitimate State interests. Content or subject matter may be regulated only if substantial State interests are involved and then the regulation may go no further than necessary to serve that interest.” (Matter of von Wiegen, 63 NY2d 163, 171.) “[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the *386 First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it my not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities”. (Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 96.) Since Justice Roberts indicated that a political button for an ecological cause (“Save the Whales”) would be favored where the instant labor-relations related button was not, a “substantial” or “compelling” governmental interest in restricting the content of the button must be demonstrated (see, Perry Educ. Assn. v Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 US 37, 45Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 461-462). Here, although Justice Roberts termed the buttons “unsettling” to defendants clients, he made no inquiry of the client, petitioner Smith, and thereafter relieved counsel for petitioner Smith despite his objection.
Thus, the record before us does not demonstrate a “compelling” State interest necessitating the Justice’s complete ban on the mere display of the small button with a particular political message.(See, Perry Educ. Assn. v Perry Local Educators’ Assn., supra, at 45.) Indeed, in light of the fact the button was worn in a nonjury courtroom, there was no showing of any “significant” governmental interest which would be served by a blanket ban, under the circumstances, in the place, manner and time of display (see, Regan v Time, Inc., 468 US 641, 648). The presumption of the court that the button had an “unsettling” and disruptive effect was made, without any inquiry or other factual foundation, and was therefore an improvident exercise of the court’s authority to control the courtroom and the proper administration of justice. (See, Matter of Peck v Stone, supra.) In addition, the court’s action violated the First Amendment and article I, § 8 free speech rights of petitioners.
“The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.” (Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 24.)
Accordingly, the application by petitioners pursuant to *387 CPLR article 78 for an order prohibiting respondent Justice George Roberts from enforcing his judgment and order requiring petitioner attorneys, on penalty of being relieved or held in contempt, to remove a political button which stated “Ready To Strike” from their lapels and requiring the restoration of the petitioner Legal Aid Society to the representation of petitioner Albert Smith, should be granted, without costs or disbursements.
Wallach, J.
The court’s ruling in this case summarily dissolved the lawyer-client relationship in two pending criminal cases based upon conduct which it allegedly perceived as impairing that relationship, namely, the lawyer’s in-court display of a lapel button containing the legend “Ready To Strike”. It also appears that in a subsequent conference on the matter the Judge indicated a toleration for the button display of some other opinions, citing as a permissible example the oceanic environmentalists’ crusade to “Save the Whales”.
If the choice had to be made between saving the lawyers or saving the whales, there is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of Americans would come down on the side of the whales. But the fact that the Calendar Judge here found himself allied with that majority must be the beginning and not the end of our review. In this case the Attorney-General, defending on appeal the challenged ruling which instantly discharged each lawyer who wore the offending “Ready To Strike” lapel button, seems to acknowledge that the controversy is not to be resolved by such a content analysis of the assertive message. First Amendment rights, it is conceded, cannot be automatically left to the not always tender tyranny of the majority viewpoint. The justification for the order raised before us (albeit not too clearly advanced in the record itself) is that a Legal Aid client, viewing the button for the first time, might undergo a tremor of unease, as expressed in the Attorney- General’s brief, “by causing the indigent criminal defendant to lose confidence in the system’s ability to guarantee him his constitutional right to vigorous representation.” This argument, implicating as it does the “undivided loyalty” to the client required of an attorney (see, People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 652, 656), is worthy of our focused attention.
No stronger statement in Anglo-American law of the single-minded duty owed by attorney to client can be found than that of Henry Brougham, who at the pinnacle of his career *388 was retained to defend Queen Caroline of England in her trial on the charge of adultery before the British House of Lords. The complainant here was, of course, the reigning monarch, King George IV. Thus, immediately brought into play was the conflict between the duty of loyalty from subject to sovereign (a breach of which could amount to treason) and the professional duty of counsel to client. Lord Brougham had no doubts as to where the path of duty lay, as he informed his fellow peers: “[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other person, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.” [FN1]
FN1 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed 1821), cited in Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship,85 Yale LJ 1060, n 1.
This stirring formulation had even its 19th century critics (Chief Justice Cockburn among them) [FN2]as well as modern ones, but since it represents perhaps the historical high-water mark of the definition of total devotion to be summoned by counsel to the client’s cause, let us accept it, for the benefit of the respondent Judge, as the Valhallan standard which he proposed to enforce. Even if we adopt that proposition, what is lacking here to sustain the court’s order are any findings or proofs that counsels’ representation here fell below this heroic level, or that the button message did, in fact, have any chilling effect on the equanimity of any particular client. The one client we know anything for certain about, petitioner Albert Smith, is a party to this proceeding; he stands before us objecting to the discharge of his counsel and seeks her reinstatement with, or without, the allegedly offensive button.
FN2 In 1864, at a dinner attended by the then-86- year-old Brougham, Cockburn observed: “The arms which an Advocate wields, he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin. He ought to uphold the interests of his clients per fas, but not per nefas. He ought to know how to reconcile the interests of his client with the eternal interests of truth and justice.” (Megarry, A Second Miscellany-at-Law, at 36 [Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1973].)
The Attorney-General embraces the court’s assumption that a client’s morale would necessarily be shaken once the message *389 of the button was perceived. But the stifling of First Amendment rights cannot be permitted to rest upon a mere assumption, particularly one so facially untenable as this. As a rationale for the court’s action, its lack of merit is apparent from the following:
(1) The order did not enjoin future private disclosure by counsel to the client of the labor dispute and the ensuing prospect of a strike; neither was the court concerned with any disclosure in the past. The defendant-morale problem did not seem significant outside the four walls of the courtroom. Nor did the disclosure which actually occurred here of an impending strike, prior to any intervention by the Judge, appear to cause any turmoil inside the courtroom. In any event, the court made no such findings.
(2) It is not beyond all conjecture, subject only to repudiation by competent proof, that some clients might find the button message encouraging, suggesting as it does that his advocate possesses a certain energetic militancy and willingness to defy “the establishment”.
(3)There is a type of experienced client, not unknown to the criminal Bar, who has learned that a swift and efficient disposition of his pending matter is ofttimes less advantageous to him than a lame and halting progress, beset by delays and obstructions at every turn. The heart of such a client, had he stood alongside one of these appellant lawyers in IAS Part 30 on October 4, 1990, before Judge Roberts, might well have leaped up to behold the message of the button, holding out, as it does, the prospect of a strike which hopefully would serve to postpone the day of reckoning in his case. Delay in a criminal case, as such a client knows, plays into his hands far more frequently than those of the People.
Since, therefore, the order rests entirely on an unproven assumption, the validity of which is dubious at best, the arraignment court’s summary directive constituted an arbitrary exercise of judicial power, and must be reversed on that ground.
Kupferman, J. P.
(Dissenting, in part).
A courtroom is not a place for the unrestricted marketing of ideas. The petitioner was free to wear a button outside the courtroom and even to picket outside the courthouse. (See, Wise, One-Day Work Stoppage by Legal Aid Lawyers, NYLJ, Jan. 30, 1991, at 1, col 3.)
Petitioner and her colleagues were in the courtroom to represent clients. They were not spectators. The Court of *390 Appeals has emphasized the single-minded allegiance owed by an attorney to the cause of the client. (See, People v Ortiz, 76 NY2d 652.)
A Judge may or can be perturbed by irrelevant issues or by the impingement of a threat to the repose necessary for judicious consideration of the problems before her or him. The petitioner is an officer of the court. She should have assisted in rather than resisted attaining that end.
The majority here assumes that the Judge was concerned with the offense to his sensibilities rather than with the due administration of justice. No such assumption can be made. That I would not have reacted as the Judge did and perhaps have made a poor quip as to whether “strike” was a baseball term and the season was over, is beside the point. I do not take seriously the in terrorem effect of the statement on the button.
However, the Judge must have decorum in the court, and must have counsel who are in the courtroom for court business. The client must know that the lawyer is there for him or her and not for an extraneous labor issue.
“To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the Heaven.” (Ecclesiastes 3:1.) It also applies to place, and the Judge had a right to rule that the button was not, with its comment, in the proper place at the proper time.
I would deny and dismiss the petition, without costs. I would, of course, allow the intervention by the union.
Carro, J., concurs with Asch, J.; Wallach, J., concurs in a separate opinion; Kupferman, J. P., dissents in part in a separate opinion.
Application for a writ of prohibition granted, without costs. *391

July 16, 2013

2013.07.16: Corrected links to Pix from Sunday Trayvon demos

Filed under: Civil Rights,Criminal Justice,Racism,Sentencing — nyclaw01 @ 1:15 pm

From: Michael Letwin
Sent: Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 1:15 PM
To: 1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS
Subject: Corrected links to Pix from Sunday Trayvon demos

No FB account necessary to view:

Boro Hall, Brooklyn:

Union Square:

And this:

Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) 1


2013.07.16: Trayvon: 6:30 Tonight in Washington Heights

Filed under: Civil Rights,Criminal Justice,Racism,Sentencing — nyclaw01 @ 12:10 pm

From: Michael Letwin
Date: Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 12:10 PM
Subject: Trayvon: 6:30 Tonight in Washington Heights
To: 1199 Members, ALAA MEMBERS

Trayvon Washington Hts
Sent: Sun, Jul 14, 2013 12:16 pm
Subject: [Personas Indignadas] Justicia para Trayvon! Nuestros
Hijos/as son Seres Humanos- Justice for Trayvon! Our Children ARE human beings!
Beloved community,
Many of us went to sleep heavy hearted after hearing the verdict on the George Zimmerman case for the murder of Trayvon Martin. Once again the criminal (in)justice system has demonstrated that its laws have been created and utilized to dehumanize and criminalize our brown and black people. Those of us who ever thought to live in a “post-racial America” have received a wake up call – racism is alive and well. What does this verdict mean to our communities of color? What are the implications that this verdict has for the safety of young black/brown men? We should be outraged! We should be concerned! This verdict means our youth wont be able to walk the streets without being fatally profiled, assaulted and murdered (as if this was not the case before!) NOW there is a precedent of a civilian acting in the capacity of a “neighborhood watch” who has killed a black boy and has received approval by the justice system. If we fail to condemn this behavior we are consenting to the killings of our youth. We must demand JUSTICE or prepare to become even more frightened for our lives and the lives of our loved ones. I refuse to live in fear for myself, my family and the youth I work with. We have the right to live in peace! Join us as we demand justice and light candles in solidarity with the Martin family on Tuesday, July 16th at 6:30pm on Mitchell Square Park/ 168th Street & Broadway. Flyers attached.
Querida comunidad,
Muchas/os de nosotras/os nos fuimos a dormir con los corazones pesados anoche tras el veredicto en el caso de George Zimmerman por el asesinato de Trayvon Martin. Una vez mas el sistema de (in)justicia criminal nos demostro que sus leyes han sido creadas para criminalizar y deshumanizar a nuestra gente. Quienes alguna vez pensaron vivir en una “America pos-racial” han recibido un llamado – el racismo vive y esta fuerte aquí. Que significa este veredicto en nuestras comunidades? Cuales son las implicaciones de este veredicto para la seguridad de nuestros hombres jóvenes Afro-Americanos y Latinos? Debemos de indignarnos! Debemos de preocuparnos! Este veredicto significa que nuestros jóvenes no podrán caminar las calles de sus comunidades sin sentir el acoso brutal y hasta enfrentar la muerte por su color de piel (como si no hubiese sido esta una realidad ya!) Ahora, esta el precedente de que un civil en la capacidad de “vigilante” a matado a un joven negro y ha recibido probación por el sistema de justicia. Si no condenamos este comportamiento estamos consintiendo el asesinato de nuestros jóvenes. Demandemos justicia o preparémonos para vivir en mas temor por nuestras vidas y la vida de nuestros/as seres queridos/as. Yo me rehuso a vivir en temor por mi vida, la de mi familia y los/as jóvenes con quien trabajo. Unete a la vigilia por la paz y justicia, y en solidaridad con la familia Martin el Martes, 16 de julio a las 6:30pm en Mitchell Square Park/ 168th Street & Broadway. Volantes adjuntos.
En la lucha,
Da Urban Butterflies (D.U.B)
“Changing the world… a block at a time!”

July 15, 2013

2013.07.15: RE: Trayvon Protests

Filed under: Civil Rights,Criminal Justice,Racism — nyclaw01 @ 1:35 pm

From:    Letwin, Michael

Sent:   Monday, July 15, 2013 1:35 PM

To:     Letwin, Michael; 1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS

Subject:        RE: Trayvon Protests

Pix from yesterday at Boro Hall, Brooklyn:

Pix from yesterday at Union Square:



From:    Letwin, Michael

Sent:   Monday, July 15, 2013 10:50 AM

To:     1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS

Subject:        Trayvon Protests


<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

Amazing turnout last night. Lots of pix and video at:

Today (so far)
5 p.m.: Union Square


7 p.m.: Hunts Point Plaza, Bx



July 14, 2013

2013.07.14: 6 pm tonight in union square: trayvon

Filed under: Civil Rights,Criminal Justice,Racism,Sentencing — nyclaw01 @ 11:55 am
From: Michael Letwin
Sent: Sunday, July 14, 2013 11:55 AM
To: 1199 Members; ALAA MEMBERS
Subject: 6 pm tonight in union square: trayvon

July 9, 2013

2013.07.09: Happy Hour for Pelican Bay 7/11 6:30 at the Magician

Filed under: Civil Rights,Criminal Justice,Prisoners' Rights,Racism,Sentencing — nyclaw01 @ 2:55 pm

From: Nora Carroll
Sent: Tuesday, July 09, 2013 2:55 PM
To: ALAA MEMBERS; 1199 Members
Subject: [non-work] Happy Hour for Pelican Bay 7/11 6:30 at the Magician

Hi LAS – as you may know, there are thousands of inmates in California prisons on hunger strike as of yesterday, July 8, in protest of conditions. There is doing a fundraiser/happy hour/petition-signing party at the Magician this Thursday; come on out and support! Sorry for the last minute notice, but this was thrown together at the last minute. Details here:

Here’s the facebook event page… And here are the details:

This iteration of NextGin happy hour will also be an opportunity to donate and sign the petition in support of the Pelican Bay State Prison hunger strikers in California! (More on the strike here:

Join the young (at heart) lawyers, legal workers, future lawyers of the National Lawyers Guild and ALL supporters of the Pelican Bay strikers for:

NextGin: Happy Hour with the Next Generation Committee of the NLG-NYC!

Please join us for a good cause, good company, friendly faces, radical lawyering talk, cheap drinks.

When: Thursday July 11th from 6:30pm to 10 PM!

Location: The Magician – 118 Rivington st. Manhattan!

Hope to see you there and bring/invite others!

In solidarity,

Your NLG-NYC Next Generation Committee

Co-sponsored by the Mass Incarceration Committee (NYC-NLG) &

The Anti-Racism Committee of the NYC-NLG &

The NYC Jails Action Coalition &

The New York State Prisoner Justice Network

Blog at